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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - TORT IMMUNITY - LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL 
INJURIES CAUSED BY NUISANCE MAINTAINED BY CITY-Plaintiff, while in the 
bathhouse of a municipally owned and operated swimming pool, was in-
jured by a shock received from an electric hair dryer. In sustaining plain-
tiff's claim against the city for damages, the trial court recognized liability 
for personal injuries caused by a nuisance created and maintained by a city 
as an exception to the common law doctrine of municipal immunity from 
tort liability. On appeal, held, reversed. The nuisance exception from a 
municipality's common law immunity extends only to injuries to real prop-
erty occasioned by a municipally created and maintained nuisance. City of 
Decatur v. Parham, 268 Ala. 585, 109 S. (2d) 692 (1959). 
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The common law concept of a municipal corporation's immunity from 
tort liability has in most jurisdictions been evaded, narrowed or destroyed 
through legislative enactments,1 judicial decisions2 and the development 
of the governmental-proprietary function distinction.3 Under the last 
theory, the municipality engaged in the performance of an act for the 
public benefit, and not for its own proprietary corporate profit, is immune 
from liability for injuries inflicted while performing such governmental 
activities.4 This "governmental function" immunity, however, has been 
further narrowed by the development of the strict "nuisance exception" 
under which a city is liable for damages to real property caused by a nuisance 
maintained by it, even though in a governmental capacity.'> This narrow 
exception, originally concerned with the relationship between a municipal-
ity as a land owner and contiguous property owners, had its origin in an 
attempt by the courts to reconcile the immunity doctrine with the constitu-
tional prohibition against the taking of private property for public use 
without just compensation.6 The concept then became embodied, in a 
number of jurisdictions, in a more broadly stated nuisance doctrine, ration-
alized in terms of some supposed "principle of universal application-that 
every man shall transact his lawful business in such a manner as to do no 
unnecessary injury to another."7 Here the courts found that a municipality 
in the use of its land owed the same duties with respect to neighboring prop-
erty as did private land owners. To avoid extension of this concept to its 
logical conclusion of a comparable duty to do "no unnecessary injury" to 
the person, a fiction developed that any use of real estate by the municipal-
ity which resulted in injury to private property interests was deemed a 
l See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 122, §§821-831, codifying the rule of Molitor v. 
Kaneland Community Unit Dist. 302, note 2 infra, but limiting school district liability to 
$10,000; 11 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1950) §53. But see Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 34, 
§301.1 (counties), c. 57½, §3a (forest preserve districts), c. 105, §§333.2a (Chicago Park 
District) and 491 (park districts), codifying the common law immunity of those govern-
mental corporations, and apparently precluding operation of the nuisance exception. 
2 See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, (Fla. 1957) 96 S. (2d) 130, note, 56 MICH, L. 
REv. 465 (1958), restricting municipal immunity to injuries caused in the performance of 
judicial, legislative, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions. See especially Molitor 
v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. 302, (III. 1959), 27 U.S. Law Week 2608 (judicially 
abrogating common law immunity of school districts). The case was approved and ex-
plained on rehearing, (Ill. 1959) 163 N.E. (2d) 189, but without noting passage of the 
Illinois statutes cited in note I supra. But see Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 
(Wyo. 1959) 338 P. (2d) 808, refusing to abrogate the common law immunity by judicial 
decision. 
3 See, e.g., Krantz v. Hutchinson, 165 Kan. 449, 196 P. (2d) 227 (1948); Hannon v. 
Waterbury, 106 Conn. 13, 136 A. 876 (1927). 
4See, e.g., Glenn v. Raleigh, 248 N.C. 378, 103 S.E. (2d) 482 (1958); Houston v. 
Shilling, 150 Tex. 387, 240 S.W. (2d) 1010 (1951); Hannon v. Waterbury, note 3 supra; 
Mayor and Alderman of Savannah v. Jones, 149 Ga. 139, 99 S.E. 307 (1919). 
5 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Totten, 5 F. (2d) 374 (1925); Mootry v. Danbury, 
45 Conn. 550, 29 Am. Rep. 703 (1878); Mayor of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio (N.Y.) 433, 
38 Am. Dec. 699 (1845). 
6 See, e.g., Mansfield v. Balliett, 65 Ohio St. 451, 63 N.E. 86 (1902). 
7 Mootry v. Danbury, note 5 supra, at 556. 
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matter within the control and observation of the corporation itself, where-
as any personal injury resulting from improper use of this property was 
attributable to the negligence of the individual custodian for which the 
municipality was not to be liable.a But with the growing dissatisfaction 
with the entire concept of municipal immunity, and particularly with the 
artificial governmental-proprietary distinction, the nuisance exception was 
often extended to encompass personal injuries caused by a municipally 
created and maintained nuisance. This extension was usually undertaken 
without consideration of the real property relationship upon which the 
nuisance exception was based,9 with the result that actions that were actu-
ally based on negligence soon came to be classified as nuisance for the 
purpose of further narrowing municipal tort immunity.1° 
The principal case, while recognizing municipal liability for damage 
to real property occasioned by a true nuisance,11 refused to extend the rule 
to include injuries to the person. This position, although subscribed to by 
relatively few jurisdictions,12 was correctly averred to be one consistent with 
the basic rationale upon which the nuisance exception was grounded. That 
this position is probably the desirable one is shown by the confusion and 
inconsistency resulting in jurisdictions which have attempted to make 
further inroads on municipal immunity by torturing the law of nuisance. 
For example, Michigan, fearful of classifying negligent acts as nuisance, has 
permitted recovery for personal injuries only in cases where nuisance per 
se has been established,13 while in New Jersey active wrongdoing is the 
criterion for assessing personal injury damages occasioned by nuisance.14 
In Wisconsin, liability is not imposed if the relationship of governor and 
governed exists between the municipality and the injured party.15 Of those 
uncommitted jurisdictions which have not yet joined the trend toward 
extension of the nuisance exception to include personal injuries, some 
already allow nuisance actions against the municipality to recover damages 
for injury to real property, and because of their tacit recognition of possible 
s See David, "Municipal Liability in Tort in California," 7 So. CAL. L. R:Ev. 214 (1934). 
See also 19 R.C.L. 1085 (1917). 
9 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 A. 499 (1931); Renstrom v. Nampa, 
48 Idaho 130, 279 P. 614 (1929); Knoxville v. Lively, 141 Tenn. 22, 206 S.W. 180 (1918). 
But see Mullins Hospital v. Squires, 233 S.C. 186, 104 S.E. (2d) 161 (1958). 
10 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Island Park, 304 N.Y. 268, 107 N.E. (2d) 441 (1952); Warren 
v. Bridgeport, 129 Conn. 355, 28 A. (2d) I (1942). 
11 Principal case at 590. 
12 See, e.g., Vater v. County of Glenn, 49 Cal. 815, 309 P. (2d) 844 (1958); Bojko v. 
Minneapolis, 154 Minn. 167, 191 N.W. 399 (1923). 
13 Curtis v. Grand Trunk R. Co. of Canada, 178 Mich. 382, 144 N.W. 824 (1914). 
14 Casale v. Housing Authority of City of Newark, 42 N.J. Super. 52, 125 A. (2d) 895 
(1956). 
15 For example, in Champeau v. Village of Little Chute, 275 Wis. 257, 81 N.W. (2d) 
562 (1957), the use of a garbage dump as a play area by the injured plaintiffs was com-
pletely outside the purpose of the village in maintaining the dump. Since the plaintiffs 
were not availing themselves of the intended purpose of the dump, the governor-governed 
relationship did not exist and liability was imposed. 
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extension of the exception,16 may be expected to include personal injury 
within the nuisance exception when the opportunity arises. But the ob-
servation of the present confusion in the law of nuisance and negligence 
when municipal liability is in question should make any uncommitted 
jurisdiction think twice before finding that the policy of indemnifying the 
injured party justifies the extension of the nuisance exception to include 
personal injuries. 
] ames Hourihan 
16 See, e.g., Pearson v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W. (2d) 485 (1932). 
